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Abstract
The article aims to develop a theoretical framework 
of interdependent model based on stated-owned 
enterprises and private enterprises. There are three 
steps of interdependence, that is subordination (before 
1978), relaxation (from 1978 to 1992), and multiform 
interdependent (since 1993). During the progress of 
corporate governance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
transfer from “danwei” (work unit society) to “enterprise”, 
however, private enterprises changes from “grass-root 
organization for making a living” to “enterprise”. In 
general, different enterprises gain different support from 
different government levels and different government 
levels rely on different types of enterprises to achieve 
their goals. SOEs internal management is concentrated 
within a single person who may have several titles. In 
private enterprise, power is often concentrated within a 
single owner. Private enterprise development necessarily 
depends upon this owner’s social network.
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INTRODUCTION
China has been undergoing a great transition since the end 
of 1970s. Governance is a hot topic, and many researchers 
from economics, political science and other disciplines 
have studied the transition from corporate governance to 
public governance. Certain economists first introduced 
the term of governance from foreign literatures, term 
such as “corporate governance” or “corporate governance 
structure” is widely used in the discussion of corporate 
restructuring and enterprise reform (WU, 1994; 
QIAN, 1995; ZHANG, 1997; YANG, 1997; LI, 2002). 
Subsequently, the concept “governance” was used in 
public administration studies by political scientists and 
other scholars (YU, 2002; XU, 2002). However, most 
economists in China focused on relationships between 
property rights, the capital market, and corporate 
governance. They paid little attention to relevant political 
factors. 
Obviously, the clarity and definition of property rights 
is a prerequisite for an effective governance structure, but 
it does not automatically lead to an effective corporate 
governance and efficiency. Property rights, not just defined 
in laws and regulations, can be implemented effectively in 
the political system, social norms, and cultural practices. 
As Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997) points 
out, “In the corporate governance process, the political 
pressure and economic pressure are equally important.” 
Stanford University political science professor Jean C. 
Oi (2004) also focused on analyzing the significance of 
the political constraints when she studied on Chinese 
enterprises restructuring. 
As we all know, corporate governance model in a 
country is the result of choice by its political, economic, 
historical and cultural factors. With regard to corporate 
governance models worldwide, a well-known “dichotomy” 
is advanced. One is the competitive model as represented 
by countries such as the U.S., U.K., Canada and other 
countries. Another one is the cooperative model as 
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represented by German, Japan and other countries. Market-
oriented reforms in China are far away from a market 
economy. How can property rights be implemented 
effectively within China’s real political, economic and 
cultural practices? Compared to the competitive model 
for corporate governance in the U.S. and U.K., and the 
cooperative model in Japan and Germany, what type 
of model or beginning of a model has arisen in China 
during the past 30 years? In China, it is not the market, 
but the state, as both the major shareholder and regulator 
of the firm, that is in more control of the development of 
corporate governance and its enforcement. As a result, the 
difference implies that for Chinese firms the best practice 
of corporate governance cannot be simply imported from 
the West without any adaptation to the local business and 
political environment. Chinese corporate governance 
in the future should be developed in line with legal 
development and ownership reform (LIU, 2005).  
In response to these problems, we study in the literature 
and empirical research based on the following central 
proposition: (1) the corporate governance in China today 
is interdependent model, which is survival respond to 
the government and corporate pressure. (2) During the 
process of seeking its power legitimacy after 1992, the 
Chinese Communist Party sought to develop the economy 
by reforming state-owned enterprises and encouraging 
the development of the private sector. (3) Whether state-
owned enterprises (called SOEs in the paper) or private 
enterprises (called PEs in the paper), their survival and 
development are all strongly dependent on the government, 
which control almost all of resource in society. 
At present the main types of Chinese enterprises, 
including SOEs, PEs and foreign-invested enterprises and 
their mixed form. For ease of analysis, this paper just study 
SOEs and PEs. After the introduction, this paper comprises 
other four parts: the second part discusses the theoretical 
framework and three steps of interdependence; the third 
and fourth part testified the interdependence model by data 
and cases of state-owned enterprises and the private sector 
respectively; and finally concluding remarks. 
1.  INTERDEPENDENT MODEL
1.1  Theoretical Framework
This research proposes an interdependent model in 
transitional China. In this model, the government is 
divided into different levels – Central Government, Middle 
Government, and Local Government. The government has 
four overall goals – Ideology (G1), Social integration (G2), 
Economic development (G3) and Official utilities (G4). 
Of course, these targets vary depending on time period 
and government level. 
At the same time, enterprises in China can be divided 
into four kinds – Central SOEs and Local SOEs, Big 
PEs and Small PEs. Enterprise also has four targets – 
Institutional adaption (E1), Making a living (E2), Making 
profits (E3) and Enterpriser utilities (E4).
When we look at government and enterprise together, 
we find there are three steps of interdependence (as 
shown in Figure 1). The period before 1978, we call 
“subordination”, which means everything and everyone 
was controlled by the central government. From 1978 to 
1992, there is deregulation. And, from 1993 to the present, 
we see multiform interdependence. This interdependent 
model has a strong theoretical foundation in China’s social 
and cultural philosophies, political and economic systems, 
and historical traditions. This is the theoretical framework 
for the interdependent model. We will analyze its three 
steps in detail in succession. 
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Figure 1  
The Theoretical Framework of Interdependent Model
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1.2  Before 1978: Subordination
Chinese enterprises have never left the political influence 
from ancientry to this day. In ancient China, the “stressing 
agriculture and suppressing business” traditional culture 
had rooted in society at all level deeply. For example, the 
famous businessmen in Chinese history such as Shanxi 
gang and Anhui gang, were all dependent on the imperial 
way of doing business directly or indirectly, to accept the 
dominant imperial power, and willing to serve as a vassal 
to obtain huge profits. Early industrial enterprises in China 
had been maintained close and complex relationship with 
the official. 
The establishment of The People’s Republic of 
China means that the vision of “people are the masters” 
had become a reality. Though in the beginning of New 
China foundation, all kinds of economy sectors were 
encouraged to compete and cooperate equally. However, 
the governance system will soon appear on a new basis of 
power and authority to configure a more focused top-down 
one-way operation characteristics. Furthermore, central 
government struggled to restructure the whole society and 
aimed to social integration by “people community” system 
and education of socialistic ideology. As Deng Xiaoping 
said, “Excessive concentration of power”, “sharing 
everything between party and government”, “enterprises 
belong to government totally”, “political tendency of 
social affairs”, “a serious bureaucratic problems”.
Therefore, before 1978, China had chosen the path of 
the planned economy and ideology and social integration 
were emphasized turgidly. Enterprise had been replaced 
by Danwei, which had to conform to the planned 
economic system. To establish a nationwide unified state-
owned economy, people were only able to make a living 
and lacked of motivation to energize the economy.
1.3  1978-1992: Relaxation
From 1978 to 1992, exploration and experiments in 
deregulation were carried out in some areas far from 
Beijing and other major cities. The motivation for these 
changes came from entrepreneurs (including farmers) and 
local governments. 
In 1978, Anhui Province suffered a rare drought. 
Eighteen farmers in Xiaogang village, Fengyang County, 
signed in a contract spontaneously with local government 
which was the first one contract about production 
allocation between government and farmer of that time in 
China. This approach spread rapidly in the province. As a 
result, the total grain output in the hundred-year drought 
years still overpassed the level of 29.6 billion jin in the 
normal time. The household contract, which means “the 
surplus production belong to household except for handing 
in to the central government and local government 
enough”, had attracted the attention of the main officials 
in central government. Personal consciousness of private 
property had recognized and supported in some ways after 
reforming from countryside.
Hereafter, relaxation reform spread to towns and 
cities rapidly. At that time, thirty million educated youth 
gradually returned to the city, they could only fend 
for themselves since government at all level, public 
enterprises and institutions could not accommodate them 
at that moment. So that a lot of individual industrial, 
commercial households and small business started-up 
in some areas far from major cities such as Wenzhou in 
Zhejiang province.
Without the support of local government, it was 
difficult for businesses that were not SOEs to germinate 
and develop. Under these new conditions, the central 
government had to relax control and prioritize economic 
development as a target. But it was not very easy for the 
central government to forget ideology.
1.4  1993-Present: Multiform Interdependent
After the Tiananmen event in 1989, the Chinese 
Communist Party sought to legitimize its power 
by developing the economy, and the goals of local 
governments were very different from those of the central 
government. 
Through over 10 years of economic reform and 
development, we can see the gradual emergence of 
multiform interdependence among different levels of 
government and different kinds of enterprise. SOEs can be 
divided into Central SOEs and Local SOEs. Central SOEs 
belong to the central government. Local SOEs belong to 
local government.  
PEs can be divided into big PEs and small PEs. Only 
a small portion of PEs are very big; most are small or 
medium sized. The big PEs have an interdependent 
relationship with the central government. At the same 
time, local governments also want to maintain good 
relationships with these famous companies. Some small 
PEs have relationships with local governments. These 
multiform interdependencies are very complicated since 
they change depending on the people and period involved.
In the context of economic globalization, all levels 
of government, as the center of economic development, 
responded positively to increasingly fierce international 
and national competition. All kinds of resources, 
departments at all level, SOEs, PEs and other economic 
sector were integrated through the power of government. 
Under this circumstance, the interdependent model of 
corporate governance was strengthened continuously. 
It demonstrated the following characteristics: First, the 
government at all level and enterprises shared the same 
objective – to develop the economy and to increase 
wealth, but to some content, personal goals, organizational 
goals and national goals were confused fallibly and 
easily. Second, property rights including corporate 
ownership and control right are still ambiguous inevitably 
between government and enterprises. Third, since lack of 
independence of the government and enterprises, decision-
makers in most of organizations could not responsible for 
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the results of their decisions. To a large extent, these above 
characteristics were displayed by corporate governance of 
SOEs and PEs in nature.
2.  STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: FROM 
“DANWEI” TO “ENTERPRISE”
In the former planned economy, China had no enterprises, 
but there were many Danwei, which was a political, 
economic, social, and cultural unit. Therefore, the reform 
of SOEs from “Danwei” to “enterprise” is the central task 
of the transition from the planned economy to a market 
economy system. From the date of the birth of SOEs, the 
reform has never stopped, but the progress was limited, 
until in 1988, SOEs were regarded as “corporate” in the 
law. Until in the end of the 20th century, the property 
rights reform of SOEs was only put in practice. 
The reform process of SOEs could be called “seizing 
the big ones, abnegating the small ones”, that is “Zhua 
da fang xiao”. It included strengthening the big SOEs 
and selling the small and less profitable ones. The 
so-called “seizing the big ones” means to cultivate 
strong and competitive large enterprises and enterprise 
groups so that they can become a trans-regional, cross-
sectoral, cross-ownership business conglomerates. As 
of 2008, the large state-owned enterprises belonged 
to the central government directly are still 141, theirs 
industry distributed extremely broad from the resource, 
monopolistic industries to general trading, consulting, 
manufacturing and other industries. The so-called 
“abnegating the small ones” refers to rent, sell and other 
forms of non-nationalization. In short, the Government’s 
aim is to reform the original “Danwei” nature of SOEs to 
become real enterprise. However, Tam (1999) contends 
that the Chinese attempt to impose adequate governance 
on large SOEs has so far been a failure, because of the 
absence of competitive markets for corporate control and 
managerial manpower that are the institutional anchors of 
the Anglo-American model.
2.1  The Reform Process of SOEs Led by 
Government
Over the past decade or so, China has progressed in 
developing the institutional foundations of a modern 
corporate governance system from the Danwei system. 
A basic legal framework including corporate, contract, 
accounting, and securities laws has been established. The 
government called its strategy for restructuring SOEs 
“Zhua da fang xiao”. Generally, the government has used 
3 approaches. (1) Allow the profitable parts of SOEs 
to become publicly listed companies; (2) Four special 
companies originating from state banks pay off debts for 
SOEs in exchange for a majority of company shares; (3) 
Government arbitrarily defines company value for sale or 
gift.
2.1.1  Allow the Profitable Parts of SOEs to Become 
Publicly Listed Companies
The pre-reform China’s SOEs were not only the 
production units, but also social service units. Generally, 
large SOEs had schools, hospitals, nurseries and other 
non-productive parts. So that, SOEs were operated 
ineffectually in a high-cost condition in long term. In 
the end of last century, non-productive sectors could be 
separated from SOEs step by step. 
At the same time, for the most valuable large-scale 
enterprises, the country’s strategy is to provide incentives 
to get the best opportunities for development. The 
government chooses a limited number of enterprises to 
allow the profitable parts of SOEs to become publicly 
listed companies. In such companies, incremental reform 
and radical reform can take place simultaneously, for 
example, the state allows an important state-wholly-
owned enterprise divide up some state-owned assets as 
a new efficient business, which is a private enterprise. 
This kind of practice of setting up a subsidiary, approved 
by the official acquiescently, enables large enterprises 
to maintain vitality and avoid the entire state-owned 
enterprises for privatization. 
2.1.2  Four Special Companies Originating from State 
Banks Pay off Debts for SOEs in Exchange for a 
Majority of Company Shares
Another important way to reform SOEs is debt-equity 
swap. Some of large-scale SOEs were selected by 
government and allowed them to exchange a certain 
percentage of old debts into shares with the newly 
established four asset management corporation, which as 
four special companies, originated from four state-owned 
specialized banks backed by the Ministry of Finance. 
This policy aimed to clean up some percentage of debt 
of large SOEs. In theory, when the profitable conditions 
of the above SOEs had improved, the asset management 
companies could buy out theirs some ratios of stock 
exchanged from debts.
2.1.3  Government Arbitrarily Defines Company Value 
for Sale or Gift
Among all kind of enterprises, the number of large 
enterprises is minority. Most of SOEs are viewed as 
small businesses, which are in charge by government 
at provincial, municipal and county levels. Like large 
enterprises, small businesses also face the same financial 
and debt issues. How to solve the problems faces by small 
businesses means heavy burden to local government. 
Since the reform policies such as becoming publicly 
listed companies and debt-equity swap are far from small 
businesses, local government has to explore effective 
choice including ownership reform and bankruptcy. Since 
1997, many provinces have declared that “they will no 
longer engage in SOEs.” The measures used are neither 
“selling”, not “dividing”, the property was not distributed 
to the citizens, but “jie ding”! The so-called “jie ding”, 
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means that government arbitrarily defines company 
value for sale or gift. Taking a enterprise — Xiang jiang 
dope for example, 80 percent of corporate stated-owned 
assets have been given to corporate insiders as gift, who 
control the whole company totally in exchange with small 
percentage of ransom money.
2.2  The Characteristics Typical of SOE Corporate 
Governance
Since government played an important role during the 
starting-up, reforming and developing process of SOEs, it 
was not equivalent to the government, but also different 
from the ordinary enterprise. The main features of its 
interdependent governance are in the following aspects.
2.2.1  Leaders of SOEs Are Often Promoted to 
Government Office
In 2987 the Eleventh National People’s Congress 
representatives, the two significant groups on behalf of 
the nation are government officials and entrepreneurs, 
the former proportion of above 50%, the latter accounts 
for about 20%, which to some extent, bring forth to 
China’s “government-led market economy” in nature. 
The tendency which leaders of SOEs are promoted to 
government office is increasing in these days. 
2.2.2  The Communist Party Is Exploring Ways to 
Effectively Manage SOEs
The Communist Party of China (CPC) is exploring ways 
to more effectively manage SOEs. Before the middle 
of the 1980s, SOEs were completely controlled by the 
CPC, but unfortunately, many were not profitable. More 
recently, some successful entrepreneurs have been hired to 
manage SOEs in hopes of changing this situation. Many 
of them have subsequently become party secretaries. 
Taking Anhui Wanwei Group Co., Ltd. for example, 
the company, subject to Anhui Provincial State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, its 
predecessor Anhui vinylon Factory, was founded in 1969. 
The Principal Leaders and Leadership System of this 
Company can be shown in Table 1.
Table 1 
The Principal Leaders and Leadership System of This Company
Period of time
Principal leaders
Leadership system
Administration Party committee
1969.10 - 1974.12 Xiong Yukun Party team
1975.05 - 1977.09 Yan Changjiu Yan Changjiu Party team
1977.10 - 1980.07 Zhang Yanxiu Yu Ping Party committee
1980.08 - 1983.07 Cai Shoumo Yang zhe Party committee
1984.02 - 1985.04 Xuan Jiabing Zhu Dianxiu Administration
1985.05 - 1990.03 Zhang Kaihui Ren Zhaoxiang Administration
1990.04 - 1992.08 Ren Zhaoxiang Ren Zhaoxiang Administration
1992.09 - 2005.08 Cheng Xingsheng Yang Kezhang Administration
2005.09 - 2008.05 Yang Kezhang Yang Kezhang Administration
2008.06 - Wu Fusheng Wu Fusheng Administration
2.2.3  Having “One Center” Is Typical in SOEs
In SOEs, leadership positions have a specific sequence. 
It is very clear which position has higher status. That is, 
having “one center” is typical in most SOEs. Sometimes 
the center is the general manager. Sometimes the center is 
party secretary. Sometimes the center is chairman of the 
board. At the same time, this person often has additional 
titles in enterprise and society.
The relationships between parent company leaders 
and spinoff or subsidiary company leaders are “two-way 
entry, cross-serving”. Most SOEs are parent companies 
that produce many spinoffs and subsidiaries. Typically, 
the board chairman in the parent company and the board 
chairman in the main spin off or subsidiary are the 
same person. This person usually is the party committee 
member in the parent company.
2.2.4  Most Central SOEs Have No Board
C h i n a ’s  S t a t e - o w n e d  A s s e t s  S u p e r v i s i o n  a n d 
Administration Commission of the State Council, 
established in 2003 as the investor deputy of central SOEs, 
is responsibility for earning profit by state-owned capital, 
promoting corporate restructuring and establishing modern 
enterprise system. Until 2006, China’s State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council permitted only about a dozen central SOEs to 
experiment with board governance. That is, most central 
SOEs have no board up to the present, which imitated the 
administration system to manage tremendous state-owned 
assets.
The previously discussed interdependent characteristics 
of SOE corporate governance reminds us that SOEs are 
still indivisible from the government and party. There is a 
long chain of principal-agent in SOEs. Taking the China 
Huaneng Group Company as example, at the end of 2008, it 
had produced 340 subsidiaries and spin offs, making it very 
difficult to supervise publicly held assets. Most publicly 
listed companies originated from SOEs. In this situation, 
it is difficult to protect the rights of minority stockholders. 
Internal corporate governance bodies have limited function.
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3.  PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: FROM 
“GRASS-ROOT ORGANIZATION FOR 
MAKING A LIVING” TO “ENTERPRISE”
3.1  Private Enterprise Depends on the Policy
In the early days of new China, private enterprises 
had experienced a period of equal competition and 
development period with state-owned sectors. However, in 
1953, the policy to private sectors of central government 
had switched from “to reconstruct, to limit” to “to make 
use of, to restrict, to reconstruct”; in 1954, the People’s 
Republic of China Constitution prescribe that “stated-
owned replacing capitalist ownership” have substituted 
“to make use of, to restrict, to reconstruct”. As a result, 
in 1956, the private sectors had been depleted when the 
reconstruction of 123,000 industrial households and 402 
million business households was completed. After the 
period of time, public-owned is the pronoun of socialism. 
Private economies, regarded as alien sector to socialism, 
had been exterminated in a long period.
Unfortunately, the dream of socialism was challenged 
by many difficulties including famine, unemployment 
social turbulence and political conflict quickly, so 
that central government had no choice. Initially, 
private enterprises required the secret support of local 
government. After farmers in countryside and worker 
in cities had carried out all kinds of exploration and 
experiments in order to make a living secretly and 
voluntarily for several years, central government began to 
recompose the regulations. 
In July 1981, a paper, issued by the State Council, 
says clearly that, “when necessary, self-employed 
households can hire one or two employees, the owner of 
small business with special skill can recruit two or three 
or less than five apprentices.” In 1982, Deng Xiaoping, 
the keyman of Chinese reform era, put forward “not to 
prohibit private sectors immediately, and observe how 
to manage them stage by stage”. Private enterprises are 
dependent upon relaxation of government restrictions. 
As we know, it is difficult for grass to grow out of stone. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of private enterprises in 
China from 1949 to 2007. 
Figure 2
The Evolution of Private Enterprises in China from 1949 to 2007
3.2  Private Enterprise Depends on the Owners
Some owners were originally government officials, some 
were military officials, some came from academic, and 
some were peasants. In private enterprises, rights of 
ownership and control are concentrated in the owner.
Table 2 shows us the capital structure of private 
enterprises. Both in the beginning and in 2005, the 
founder has more than 50 percent ownership.
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Table 2
The Capital Structure of Private Enterprises
Normal enterprise Typical enterprise Reconstructed enterprise
Non-reconstructed 
enterprise
The beginning ratio of the quantity 
of owner’ s capital 
mean value 67.78 52 59.83 69.52
Median 70 51 60 70
Standard deviation 27.16 39.35 30.34 25.7
In 2005, the ratio of owner’ s owner-
ship
mean value 68.56 48.13 59.65 70
Median 70 51 60 70
Standard deviation 26.59 36.47 29.56 25.8
The beginning ratio of the quantity 
of other personal capital
mean value 26.89 37.47 32.5 24.8
Median 20 25 30 20
Standard deviation 25.74 36.92 29.24 24.7
In 2005, the ratio of other personal 
ownership
mean value 26.04 37 32.64 24
Median 20 33 30 20
Standard deviation 25.01 32.8 28.37 24
Table 3 depicts the decision-makers in private 
enterprises. In more than 90% of private enterprises, the 
owner serves as chairman of board and general manager. 
About 40% of the owners were responsible for all 
decisions in their companies.
Table 3  
The Making-Decision System of Private Enterprises
Publicly listed 
company
Company of having 
been public
Company of wanting 
to public
Company of having 
no public idea Sum
Are you chairman, 
general manager in 
your enterprise
Yes 38 (84.4%) 19 (73.1%) 309 (89.8%) 2673 (90.4%) 3039 (90.2%)
No 7 (15.6%) 7 (26.9%) 35 (10.2%) 283 (9.6%) 332 (9.8%)
Sum 45 (100%) 26 (100%) 344 (100%) 2956 (100%) 3371 (100%)
The main decision-
maker in your enter-
prise
Yourself 21 (50%) 2 (8.7%) 66 (19.6%) 1134 (38.9%) 1223 (36.9%)
Shareholders’ 
meeting 10 (23.8%) 5 (21.7%) 60 (17.9%) 521 (17.9%) 596 (18%)
Board 6 (14.3%) 14 (60.9%) 151 (44.9%) 674 (23.1%) 845 (25.5%)
You and other 
principal managers 3 (7.1%) 2 (8.7%) 58 (17.3%) 554 (19%) 617 (18.6%)
You and party 
organization 2 (4.8%) 0 0 11 (0.4%) 13 (0.4%)
You and labour 
union 2 (4.8%) 0 0 11 (0.4%) 13 (0.4%)
Other 0 0 1 (0.3%) 5 (0.2%) 6 (0.2%)
Sum 42 (100%) 23 (100%) 336 (100%) 2912 (100%) 3313 (100%)
Manager in your 
enterprise
Yourself 18 (39.1%) 5 (20%) 80 (23.3%) 1222 (41.1%) 1325 (39.1%)
You and other 
principal managers 23 (50%) 15 (60%) 225 (65.4%) 1534 (51.6%) 1797 (53.1%)
You and party 
organization 1 (2.2%) 0 0 1 (0.3%) 12 (0.4%)
You and labour 
union 0 0 1 (0.3%) 10 (0.3%) 11 (0.3%)
Professional 
manager 4 (8.7%) 5 (20%) 36 (10.5%) 189 (6.4%) 234 (6.9%)
Other 0 0 0 6 (0.2%) 6 (0.2%)
Sum  (100%)  (100%)  (100%)  (100%) 3385 (100%)
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3.3  Private Enterprise Depends on the Initial 
Network of Owner
There are many types of private enterprise. A small 
portion of enterprises are very big, but most are small and 
medium sized. Some private enterprises were originally 
SOEs or collective enterprises. Private enterprises have 
developed throughout many industries and regions.
Various organizations within private enterprise can 
help to improve the governance structure. But corporate 
governance of publicly listed companies does not take 
advantage of the benefits of capital markets. From Table 
4, we see that boards and other governance organizations 
within private enterprises became increasingly popular 
from 1993 to 2006.
Table 4 
The Inner Organization of Private Enterprise
Share-
holders' meeting Board Supervisory boardParty organization Labour union
Employee representative 
committee
1993 —— 26.0 —— 4.0 8.0 11.8
1995 —— 15.8 —— 6.5 5.9 6.2
2000 27.8 44.5 23.5 17.4 34.4 26.3
2002 33.9 47.5 26.6 27.4 49.7 27.4
2004 56.7 74.3 35.1 30.7 50.5 31.0
2006 58.1 63.5 36.5 34.8 53.3 35.9
In private enterprises, family members make up a 
relatively high proportion of company personnel. And 
professional management and guanxi management co-
exist. Table 5 shows that 50% of private enterprises are 
family businesses.
Table 5  
The Human Capital of Private Enterprises
Publicly listed 
company
Company of hav-
ing been public
Company of want-
ing to public
Company of having 
no public idea Sum
How many parents, 
spouse, brothers and 
sisters are stockholder?
0 9(29%) 10(58.8%) 110(41.8%) 1145(50.8%) 1274(49.7%)
1 15(48.4%) 6(35.3%) 98(37.3%) 797(35.4%) 916(35.7%)
2 3(9.7%) 1(5.9%) 32(12.2%) 216(9.6%) 252(9.8%)
3 1(3.2%) 0 14(4%) 54(2.4%) 69(2.7%)
More than 3 3(9.7%) 0 9(3.4%) 40(1.8%) 52(2%)
Sum 31(100%) 17(100%) 263(100%) 2252(100%) 2563(100%)
How many parents, 
spouse, brothers and 
sisters are in board?
0 10(38.5%) 10(66.7%) 116(46.4%) 1292(62.3%) 1428(60.4%)
1 13(50%) 4(26.7%) 87(34.8%) 560(27%) 664(28.1%)
2 1(3.8%) 1(6.7%) 30(12%) 154(7.4%) 186(7.9%)
3 2(7.7%) 0 8(3.2%) 37(1.8%) 47(2%)
More than 3 0 0 9(3.6%) 30(1.4%) 39(1.6%)
Sum 26(100%) 15(100%) 250(100%) 2073(100%) 2364(100%)
How many parents, 
spouse, brothers and 
sisters are principal man-
ager?
0 11(45.8%) 11(78.6%) 118(45%) 1146(53.5%) 1286(52.6%)
1 10(41.7%) 3(21.4%) 88(33.6%) 678(31.7%) 779(31.9%)
2 1(4.2%) 0(%) 35(13.4%) 229(10.7%) 265(10.9%)
3 2(8.3%) 0(%) 9(3.4%) 52(2.4%) 63(2.6%)
More than 3 0 0(%) 12(4.6%) 37(1.7%) 49(2%)
Sum 24(100%) 14(100%) 262(100%) 2142(100%) 2442(100%)
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CONCLUSIONS
In Chinese transition from a planned economy to a market 
system economy, corporate governance model is hot and 
challenged topic. Indeed, the successful implementation of 
corporate governance reforms may mark the final stages of 
China’s evolution into a market economy (Ewing, 2005). 
This paper has put forward the interdependent model 
based on stated-owned enterprises and private enterprises. 
The transformation of the interdependent model is 
different from competitive and cooperative models: (1) 
Different enterprises gain different support from different 
government levels; (2) Different government levels rely 
on different types of enterprises to achieve their goals; (3) 
SOEs internal management is concentrated within a single 
person who may have several titles. This leader is often 
promoted to the public sector; (4) In private enterprise, 
power is often concentrated within a single owner. 
Because government support is limited, private enterprise 
development necessarily depends upon this owner’s social 
network. 
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